News & opinion on Greater China and the even Greater Beyond: by Biff Cappuccino.

Tuesday, April 12, 2005

Opening glance at The Politics, Money and Culture of Japan (in Chinese), by Chang Mu (1999). Chang is an overseas Chinese from Shandong who presumably arrived with Chiang Kai-shek et al in the great Taiwan plunder of 1948~1949.

The first chapter deals with a movement in Japan to revise the legal restrictions on Chinese characters used in the Japanese language. It's understandably common for Chinese pundits to place particular emphasis on this. Ethnocentricity of both the writer and his audience, and all that. I've yet to come across a non-native speaker writing on this topic.

Apparently, with the arrival of MacArthur and the American forces in Japan at the end of WWII, the number of Chinese characters used in the writing of Japanese was restricted by law, no less, to 1850. This was apparently the result of American research into the origins of the war with one of the conclusions being that picking up "devilish Chinese characters" was so troublesome that this alone restricted literacy to a small segment of the population. Feeling that this hindered the flow of information throughout the citizenry and thus facilitated a small claque of war-mongers launching wars, not to mention that it slowed down the democratic reforms of the US occupation, restrictions on Chinese characters came into being in 1946 and phonetics were the sole legal format for transporting terms in English and other foreign tongues into the language.

However, even as early as the Meiji Restoration there had been movements to ditch Chinese characters. For example, Japanese Barons 森有禮 and 前島密 publicly called for the abandoning of Chinese characters to deliver Japan from Asian backwardness and enter it into the enlightenment of Europe, as they termed it. They were either for dropping Chinese characters completely or for minimizing their use and substituting phonetics, either Japanese phonetics or the Roman alphabet, to efficiently manage the vast rush of foreign words pressing in. This in part also helps to explain why the Ching dynasty and the Korean monarchy armed themselves (with weapons from low European civilization) and threatened to invade Japan in the late 19th century, feeling that Japan was being misled by a small clique of antichrists and other sundry heretics egging the hoi polloi to turn their backs on sacred Chinese learning and culture.

It turns out that during the 1930s even Lu Xun advocated getting rid of Chinese characters because they were too difficult to learn and thus a hindrance to modernizing China. This further aided and abetted the movement in Japan. In the 1960s, a prominent Japanese fiction writer advocated the dropping of Japanese and the adoption of French as the national language. As I recall, the education minister of the time stated the same wish.

So far, so good with the history. But then we get to page 6. The author is carrying on about the notion that Chinese characters get in the way of educating the public and are a relic of the past which should be discarded. He then states: "Strictly speaking, this is simply a case of subjectively discriminating on the basis of a superficial phenomenon. Although Chinese characters can be admitted to have their flaws, their lengthy existence has ensured many generations of honing and improvement; having passed many historical tests, the survival of Chinese characters further vindicates their value."*

*This is my rough translation of: 嚴格講,這只是單從主觀意識僅憑表面現象來作判斷的片面偏見. 漢字誠然有其缺點,單它的存在則是經過悠久歷史千錘百煉而有的存在價值, 禁得起考驗的.

As soon as my eyes roved over "strictly speaking", I saw a rat. Sure enough, the ensuing sentences are so nonspecific that they can be used to support or vindicate a broad variety of propositions. For example, we could use these two sentences to argue for the return of Chinese or Roman numerals, both of which survived for thousands of years but which have since been more or less tipped into the bin. Or, if someone said they liked the color blue we could get sniffish and retort, "Strictly speaking, this is simply a case of subjectively discriminating on the basis of a superficial phenomenon.” Cough sadly and wait for applause. Or if some poor ape says something as silly as "I'm hungry" we could point our noses at the moon and ram home again with our winning trope: "Strictly speaking, this is simply a case of subjectively discriminating on the basis of a superficial phenomenon.”

This also reminds me of a recent C-Span book lecture in which a couple of self-professed historians attack Philip Short's non-politically correct views about the origins of Khmer Rouge massacres (he says they lay in part in Mahayana Buddhism and the violent traditions of the indigenous yokels.) The historians were piqued that the underdogs, i.e. the victims, might have to take responsibility for their actions. That would be blaming the victim, right? The mantra of the tearful left is "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, still shame on you." Which goes hand in hand with "Those who won't learn history can't be blamed for repeating it." The best retort the historians came up with was to demand of Philip Short just which analytical methods he used in his research. But to both Short and me, this smacked of rhetorical trickery.

The ability to articulate which analytical methods you're using is of course valuable. It also suggests that you've taken a look at various methods and are aware of their pros and cons and the various pitfalls that they tend to generate. Excellent stuff. However in the context of his lecture this was simply a game whereby, if unable to parrot a rabbit's breakfast of academic jargon, then they could pounce and call him an ignoramus and an amatoor. This, no less, care of several young fools of apparently graduate school age. The will to power is strong in all of us, the young and insecure particularly. For those educated above their intelligence, an inferiority complex is part and parcel of graduating and one’s professional existence in the ever after. Hence the snooty defensive attitude of so many, many academics that can be heard on NPR when they’re put up against such fearful characters as autodidacts who sneer at mentoring and activists who do their research out in the field where the action is taking place. Amatoors all.
I'm going to have to slow down and pay more attention to my commentary. Some of it's ludicrous, some overwrought, much of it wordy because I've not taken the time to locate one word or phrase to either capture or freeze-frame the idea in question. I've been cranking stuff out too fast in order to concentrate on reading, and the lack of editing is leaving behind too many howlers. Not to mention content's getting repetitive and consistently shallow. Biff...

Monday, April 11, 2005

More on the roots of Japanese traditional behavior from Ruth Benedict (who stresses cultural norms) and Lafcadio Hearn (who sees most behavior, Oriental or Occidental, emerging from religious thought & traditions, something I've found with the Chinese). Again, my primary goal reading these two books was to try to understand why "the Japanese" were so severe in the WWII, particularly given how mild "they" had been in WWI and while ruling Taiwan.

Ruth Benedict: "... the Tokugawas, by the most drastic laws any nation has ever enforced, decreed the isolation of Japan in the 17th century...making it an offense worthy of capital punishment to build or operate any boat large than a certain size. The small boats allowed could not cross to the continent or carry loads of trade goods. Domestic trade was severely restricted too by customs barriers which were set up on the borders of each fife with strict rules against letting goods in or out. Sumptuary laws regulated clothes they could wear, the umbrellas they could carry, the amount they could spend for a wedding or a funeral. [Merchants] could not live in a samurai district. They had no legal protection against swords of the samurai..."

So the stupefying of the population carried on. Restricting external trade minimized contact with the intellectual moods, technology, and multiculturalism of the developing world for which the calendar meant time was moving forward. Japan's restrictions on what citizens could purchase, dream up, carry out, plan for themselves and their children, etc and so forth further simplified and ossified life. In turn this frogmarching of the farmer, samurai, artisan, and politically connected bored the crap out of the imaginative, put the thumb screws to IQ growth, and enhanced poor logic and decision-making skills by making them poorer in a patriotically approved manner. "The two classes which are appropriate to stable feudalism, the Warriors and the farmers, the Tokugawas regime froze into rigid forms.... the Warriors could no longer be farmers nor artisans nor merchants. Not even the lowest of them could any longer legally be a producer; he was a member of a parasitic class which drew its annual rice stipend from taxes levied upon the peasants."

More road map of the can-do cynical politico and his pet, the idealistic and diligent patriot, for minimizing intellectual opportunity and business initiative; a form of feudal socialism which (as with today's modern socialist nations such as England and Canada) meant more restrictions on free behavior which meant less opportunities for making choices good and bad which meant more dumbing down and the impoverishing of the domestic economy by preventing organic growth of the marketplace. So many traditional societies are into the pure, by which they mean the simple. Whereas in modern societies simple means dumb, simpleton means dumbass. The usual stigmata of socialist idealism are there: punishing taxation and the cultivation of permanent, large classes deliberately kept out of gainful employment (everyone from today's welfare bum to bureaucratic flunkies hired by the millions to shuffle endless mills of paperwork to prove the government is committed to job creation). In other words, the Tokugawas ensured Japanese feudalism's survival by snuffing freethinkers, entrepreneurs, and other destabilizing cranks, by converting a free-range state into a national museum requiring travel permits, and by giving the wonder a golden sheen by preventing word of its failures from getting around. An improvement on North Korea but not by all that much. And so the golden era dragged Japan behind behind the rest of the developing world, rusting the national culture's gift for rapid innovation and its leadership in the development of firearms, for example, in the 17th century.

Fortunately some oppressors arrived to mix things up: Perry's Black Ships of 1853 which undertook the infamous American/Japanese equivalent of China's Opium War -- forcing open the economy's virginal drawers, getting hot and bothered and breathing fetid life back into the canned low-oxygen atmosphere. Hitting the socio-economic g-spot and misceginating, baby. In other words, the colonizers despite their initial slaughters (a human artifact of time and circumstance, not a nationally enduring one) were not oppressors even had they wanted to be, but rather accidental emancipators of the oppressed.

These days it's usually traditional indigenous racialism and cultural chauvinism, and not the damage caused by Uncle Sammy's imperial rough housing, which causes failure in Third World nations. Most nations have beautiful legends for their makeover of traditional poverty. It's the same traditions that has patriots crying into their beer over invaders with strange skin tones and guttural dialects operating with the ulterior motive of oppression; as opposed to the bona fides of the leaders, dreamers, and statesmen of their golden ages: feudal lords, barons, and other local worthies on the national tithe (i.e. dole), not to mention anemic inbred emperors and their dandified retainers.

Check out this beatific aspect of justice in the golden era: "When a [farmer's] petition was intercepted or the daimyo took no notice of their complaints they sent their representatives to the capital to present their written complaints to the shogunate. In famous cases they could ensure its delivery only by inserting it into some high officials palanquin when as he rode through the streets of the capital. But, no matter what risks the farmers took in delivering the petition, it was then investigated by the shogunate authorities and about half of the judgments were in favor of the peasants.
Japan's requirements of law and order were not satisfied, however, with the shogunate's judgment on the farmers claims. Their complaints might be just and it might be advisable for the state to honor them. But the peasant leaders had transgressed the strict law of hierarchy. Regardless of any decision in their favor, they had broken the essential law of their allegiance and this could not be overlooked. They were therefore condemned to death. The righteousness of their cause had nothing to do with the matter. Even the peasants accepted this inevitability. The condemned men were their heroes and the people came in numbers to the execution where the leaders were boiled in oil or beheaded or crucified, but at the execution the crowds did not riot. This was law and order. They might afterward build to the dead men shrines and honor them as martyrs, but they accepted the execution as part and parcel of the hierarchical laws by which they lived."

Along the same lines on page 70 and 71, Ruth Benedict writes, "And during two centuries when law and order were maintained in such a world with an iron hand, the Japanese learned to identify this meticulously plotted hierarchy with safety and security. So long as they stayed within known boundaries, and so long as they fulfilled known obligations, they could trust their world. Banditry was controlled. Civil war between the daimyo was prevented.... One trusted the map and was safe only when one followed it. One showed one's courage, one's integrity in conforming to it, not in modifying it or in revolting against it.... Its rules were not abstract ethical principles of the decalogue but tiny specifications of what was due in this situation and what was due in that situation; what was due with one were a samurai and what was do if one were common and; what was proper to elder brother and what was proper to younger brother."

To give you a better idea of how specific the specifications were, check this out from Lafcadio Hearn's Japan, An Attempt at Interpretation: "Where a man's life was legally ordered even to the least particulars,--even to the quality of his foot-gear and head-gear, the cost of his wife's hairpins, and the price of his child's doll,--one could hardly suppose that freedom of speech would have been tolerated. It did not exist; and the degree to which speech became regulated can be imagined only by those who have studied the spoken tongue. The hierarchical organization of society was faithfully reflected in the conventional organization of language.
Of terms corresponding to "you" or "thou" there are still sixteen in use; but formerly there were many more. There are yet eight different forms of the second person singular used only in addressing children, pupils, or servants.[1] Honorific or humble forms of nouns indicating relationship were similarly multiplied and graded: there are still in use nine terms signifying "father," nine terms signifying "mother," eleven terms for "wife," eleven terms for "son," nine terms for "daughter," and seven terms for "husband."
...Against harakiri, as punitive suicide, there was no legislative enactment, for obvious reasons. It would seem that this form of self-destruction was not known to the Japanese in early ages; it may have been introduced from China, with other military customs. The ancient Japanese usually performed suicide by strangulation, as the Nihongi bears witness. It was the military class that established the harakiri as a custom and privilege.
As the military power developed in Japan, the Chinese code of vengeance became universally accepted; and it was sustained by law as well as by custom in later ages. Iyeyasu himself maintained it--exacting only that preliminary notice of an intended vendetta should be given in writing to the district criminal court. The text of his article on the subject is interesting:--
"In respect to avenging injury done to master or father, it is acknowledged by the Wise and Virtuous [Confucius] that you and the injurer cannot live together under the canopy of heaven. A person harbouring such vengeance shall give notice in writing to the criminal court; and although no check or hindrance may be offered to the carrying out of his design within the period allowed for that purpose, it is forbidden that the chastisement of an enemy be attended with riot. Fellows who neglect to give notice of their intended revenge are like wolves of pretext:[1] their punishment or pardon should depend upon the circumstances of the case."

And what did all of this and more lead to? In part, to people with so little freedom to act on their own volition that behavioral aberration and crime and even thought-crime hardly existed. This produced a very interesting spin.

From Lafcadio Hearn: ""Human beings," wrote Motowori, "having been produced by the spirits of the two Creative Deities, are naturally endowed with the knowledge of what they ought to do, and of what they ought to refrain from doing. It is unnecessary for them to trouble their minds with systems of morality. If a system of morals were necessary, men would be inferior to animals,--all of whom are endowed with the knowledge of what they ought to do, only in an inferior degree to men."[1] . . . Mabuchi, at an earlier day, had made a comparison between Japanese and Chinese morality, greatly to the disadvantage of the latter. "In ancient times," said Mabuchi, "when men's dispositions were straightforward, a complicated system of morals was unnecessary. It would naturally happen that bad actions might be occasionally committed; but the straightforwardness of men's dispositions would prevent the evil from being concealed and so growing in extent. So in those days it was unnecessary to have a doctrine of right and wrong. But the Chinese, being bad at heart, in spite of the teaching which they got, were good only on the outside; so their bad acts became of such magnitude that society was thrown into disorder. The Japanese, being straightforward, could do without teaching." Motowori repeated these ideas in a slightly different way: 'It is because the Japanese were truly moral in their practice, that, they required no theory of morals; and the fuss made by the Chinese about theoretical morals is owing to their laxity, in practice. . . . To have learned that there is no Way [ethical system] to be learned and practised, is really to have learned to practise the Way of the Gods." At a later day Hirata wrote "Learn to stand in awe of the Unseen, and that will prevent you from doing wrong. Cultivate the conscience implanted in you then you will never wander from the Way."
Though the sociologist may smile at these declarations of moral superiority (especially as based on the assumption that the race had been better in primeval times, when yet fresh from the hands of the gods), there was in them a grain of truth. When Mabuchi and Motowori wrote, the nation had been long subjected to a discipline of almost incredible minuteness in detail, and of extraordinary rigour in application. And this discipline had actually brought into existence a wonderful average of character,--a character of surprising patience, unselfishness, honesty, kindliness, and docility combined with high courage."

And then came traditional volk culture, political fascism, designer emperor worship and more in the wake of the FDR and Brain Trust socialist bungling which manufactured America's worst economic collapse (consisting of the only two successive crashes the US economy has ever witnessed, though this was the sort of performance communist countries were well acquainted with, and just as confused by). Rolling through the 1930's, all cultural hell broke loose in Japan as the traditional pre-1853 cultural and behavioral norms were revived, such as political assassinations and military subordination in the name of the emperor (both had cachet and were popular) . And soon foreign adventures would plunge unwitting foreigners into a new Japanese pariah class where they were held to impossible 18th century standards and took a real kicking and much, much worse. Interesting stuff when viewed from the security of the 21st century.

Saturday, April 09, 2005

Herbert Spencer wrote a letter to Japan's Baron Kanéko Kentarô in the late 19th century which included the following: "If the Chinese are allowed to settle extensively in America, they must either, if they remain unmixed, form a subject race standing in the position, if not of slaves, yet of a class approaching to slaves; or if they mix they must form a bad hybrid. In either case, supposing the immigration to be large, immense social mischief must arise, and eventually social disorganization. The same thing will happen if there should be any considerable mixture of European or American races with the Japanese. ... You see, therefore, that my advice is strongly conservative in all directions, and I end by saying as I began--keep other races at arm's length as much as possible."

I found this in the appendix of Lafcadio Hearn's Japan, An Attempt at Interpretation. You may be as surprised as I was at Hearn's take on this letter. If interested go here.
On John Zerzan: At some point I'll have to devote a month to forensic study of some of the failed grand ideas, utopian visions, and lavender fancies that have been developed, perfected, and donated by socialist entrepreneurs to the benefit of our world. In the meantime, the primitivist John Zerzan who is distinguished for, amongst other things, his widely-known and even broadly-read works encouraging the abandonment of language and tools, not to mention his socio-political mentoring and friendship of Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, will have to suffice for the moment. John, like many others on stringent budgets, has discovered that shopping is a form of violence. From his perspective, every new purchase is an offensive gesture, a declaration of class war. Needless to say, despite having a dog in this fight, he's a pacifist.

The solution to class differences? The oldest solution of all: end all classes. But unlike Marx who professed that he wanted the world returned to the chemically pure state of the Amish, while spending most of his time hitting up Engels for rent and spending money, John's research has revealed that hunter/gatherer societies achieved true gender parity, enjoyed the most lavish leisure time. Little violence. Even less shopping.

Like Chomsky he struggles valiantly to join words to meaning; sweats gallantly to thread meaning on to words. John's works have had a galvanizing influence on the anti-globalization crowd, which though initially just mum and pissed, and thus slow to act on its own initiative, now has someone else's initiative and become vocal and sloganized. He's the new anti-money Marx who's left an enviable career in blood donations to cash in on the university lecture circuit. But let that not distract us from the fact that he's given our generation a ready to wear ideology that sticks both to the ribs and the bandanas. It was he, spiritually speaking, who wowed us at the protests in Seattle and Italy.

Here's a treat: Q: Well, let's assume for the moment that a literal return to a primitive state is desirable. Your writings have gone so far as to critique art, numbers, even language. How would you visualize a world, say, without language?

A: Thinking of a world without language entails an enormous speculative leap. From where we are now it is extremely difficult to posit or fathom a life-world based on non-symbolic communication, though of course some of that exists even now. Freud guessed that a sort of telepathy held sway before language; lovers need no words, as the saying goes. These are hints in the direction of unmediated communication. I'm sure you can think of others!

Q: When did you yourself first see through the 'lures of technology?' Have you always felt in opposition to it at some level? Was there some event or field of study that first prompted you to develop such an all-encompassing critique?

A: In the 1970s it slowly began to dawn on me, among others, that the concept of 'revolution' was somehow very inadequate. This gnawed at me at a time when I was doing graduate work in social and labor history. The first 'breakthrough' for me was in terms of the Industrial Revolution in England. Namely, it became clear that the factory system was introduced in large part as a means of social control. The dispersed craftsmen were deprived of their autonomy and brought together in factories to be de-skilled and disciplined. This shows that technology was not at all 'neutral.' This discovery helped me begin to see how division of labor is basically disempowering and alienating. One needs to look at technology as a system which contains the deeper values of the social order it embodies. It is never simply a matter of 'tools' or devices.

When summing up someone of his imaginative gifts, contribution, and dedication to the movement, after rummaging hard through my lexicon for just the right word, I don't think I could settle for anything less than: clown. He came to my attention through a documentary called Surplus. Worth checking out. Nothing better than getting it from the horse's mouth to persuade you that even a superlatively dumb dude like John can get a Ph.D. from Stanford and succeed professionally as a comedian. (link)
Part of a Review of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, by Ruth Benedict (1946)

One thing which makes this book really work is the author's decisiveness. (Page 14) [Cultural anthropology] requires both a certain tough-mindedness and a certain generosity. It requires a tough-mindedness which people of goodwill sometimes condemn. These protagonists of One World have staked their hopes on convincing people of every corner of the earth that all differences between East and West, black and white, Christian and Mohammed, are superficial and that all mankind is really like-minded. This view is sometimes called the brotherhood of man.... but to demand such uniformity as a condition of respecting another nation is as neurotic as to demand it of one's wife or one's children. The tough-minded are content the differences should exist. They respect differences. Their goal is a world made safe for differences... The study of comparative cultures cannot flourish when men are so defensive about their own way of life that it appears to them to be by definition the sole solution in the world.

(Biff) So much for her sympathy for political correctness and as good an introduction to why she wrote such an incisive and penetrating collection of chapters reaming the Japanese character and psychology and child-rearing process. Her focus is on what happened and why; not on what should have happened and who is to blame. Thank goodness for that. My primary interest in reading this book was to better understand the Japanese performance during the second world war and explore what had happened psychologically to make Japan go from being one of two nations praised by the International Red Cross for its treatment of POWs in the first world war to essentially starving to death and slaughtering its POWs of war during the second world war.

Just as in Thailand, reverence for the king/emperor was genuine and pervasive: (Page 32) All this unanimity in reckoning the emperor above criticism appeared phony to Americans who are accustomed to exempt no human man from skeptical scrutiny and criticism. But there is no question that it was the voice of Japan even in defeat. Those most experienced in interrogating the prisoners gave it as their verdict that it was unnecessary to enter on each interview sheet: 'Refuses to speak against the Emperor'; all prisoners refused, even those who cooperated with the allies and broadcast for us to the Japanese troops.

As Ruth Benedict demonstrates in later chapters, the state religion was state Shinto, as opposed to various Shinto sects and Buddhist sects in the private sector. The essential function of State Shinto was to dunk school children and members of the military (which was compulsory) in the wet notion that everything they received from the government was due to the personal authorization of the beneficient emperor. A Japanese analogue to the Christian notion of God's rapt attention over the comings and goings, doings and fumblings of every church-going stuffed shirt and blank charge. Thus the schools, uniforms, weaponry, roads, public transit, and so on and so forth came down from on high courtesy of the emperor's busy hands. All the way down, starting with government ministers on down to the smallest functionary took part in this, for lack of a better term, hoax and declared anything issued to the public as a gift from the Great Doting Busybody. This helped to get the emperor worship deal really going.

(Page 33) As many prisoners said, the Japanese' will fight unhesitatingly, even with nothing more than bamboo poles, if the emperor so decrees. They would stop just as quickly if he so decreed'; ' Japan would throw down arms tomorrow if the emperor should issue such an order'; 'even the Kwantung Army in Manchuria' - most militant and jingoistic - 'would lay down their arms'; 'only his words can make the Japanese people accept a defeat and be reconciled to live for reconstruction.'

I like that last sentence, "...to be reconciled to live for reconstruction." As opposed to the nation committing suicide. But more on this later.

I was surprised to learn that the Japanese military was not so tightly wound and strapped down that there was nil by way of free speech. However, the purpose free speech was put to was unexpected: (page 34 ~35) Prisoners of war were free with their denunciation of their local commanders, especially those who had not shared the dangers and hardship of their soldiers. They were especially critical of those who had evacuated by plane and left their troops behind to fight it out. Usually they praised some officers and bitterly criticized others; there was no sign that they lacked the will to discriminate the good from the bad things Japanese. Even in the home islands newspapers and magazines criticized 'the government.' They called for more leadership and greater coordination of effort and noted that they were not getting from the government what was necessary. They even criticized restrictions on freedom of speech.... One speaker said:' I think there are various ways to arouse the Japanese people but the most important one is freedom of speech. In these few years, the people have not been able to say frankly what they think. They have been afraid that they might be blamed if they spoke certain matters. They hesitated, and tried to patch up the surface, so the public mind has really become timid. We can never develop the total power of the people in this way.' another speaker expanded the same thing:'... The people are so badly restricted by the so-called Special Penal Law of Wartime and the National Security Law that they have become as timid as the people in the feudalistic period. Therefore the fighting power which could have been developed remains undeveloped now.'

(Biff) Like many Chinese in the PRC, no conception existed (apparently) that free speech might cut the legs out from the war effort in the first place. Free speech naturally aligned with the patriotic movement. Patriots, like other fanatics, are quick to forget that someone not in the pay of the enemy can have a sound, persuasive opposing point of view. Reminds me of the free speech Americans enjoyed, and which has been oft-praised, during United States War of Independence. You were free to speak or print any sort of opinion as long as it was pro-American. Jailing and/or tarring & feathering were the usual reward for political heresy.

Also interesting was (page 35~36)... other attitudes which had to do more specifically with the Japanese army. One of these concerned the expandability of their fighting forces. The Japanese radio put well the contrast with the American attitudes when it described with shocking credulity the Navy's decoration of Admiral George S. McCain, commander of a task force off Formosa. "... So we are not questioning the veracity of Admiral McCain's rescuing two ships, but the point we want you to see is the curious fact that the rescuing of damaged ships merits decoration in United States."
Americans thrilled to all rescue, all aid to those pressed to the wall. The valiant deed is all the more a hero's act if it saves the 'damaged.' Japanese valor repudiates such salvaging. Even the safety devices installed in our B-29's and fighter planes raised their cry of ' cowardice.'... Japanese scorn of materialism played a part in it; her soldiers were taught that death itself was a victory of the spirit. And our kind of care of the sick was an interference with heroism...
During the war the Japanese army had no trained rescue teams to remove the wounded under fire and to give first aid; it had no medical system of front line, behind the lines and distant recuperative hospitals. Its attention to medical supplies was lamentable. In certain emergencies the hospitalized were simply killed.... There was no routine of evacuating the sick and wounded while there was still opportunity... The medical officer in charge often shot the inmates of the hospital before he left or let them kill themselves with hand grenades. If this attitude of the Japanese toward damaged goods was fundamental in their treatment of their own countrymen, it was equally important in the treatment of American prisoners of war.
According to our standards the Japanese were guilty of atrocities to their own man as well as to their prisoners. The former chief medical officer of the Philippines, Colonel Harold W. gladly, said after his three years internment as a prisoner of war on Formosa that 'the American prisoners got better medical treatment in the Japanese soldiers. Allied medical officers in the prison camps were able to take care of their men while the Japanese didn't have any doctors.'

(Biff) Anyway, just as colonizers tend to treat the colonized in manner roughly on par with the manner in which lower classes of the home country are treated by the upper classes, the same turns out to be the case with Japanese treatment of prisoners of war. No surprise there. Many folk, from left-wing pain-feelers to peacetime patriots looking for a foe that can't fight back, due to physical distance or time, and then load up their foes with morals charges. But all they really do in the effort is demonstrate that they're too busy trying to work up an excuse to feel good about themselves by trampling on the memory of someone else. Why not hit the library and crack a book? Knowledge is power after all and does much more to relax the soul tormented by an inferiority complex. Besides, suggesting there's a double standard in the treatment of nationals when outside their own borders presupposes that the average person has something properly called an imagination. Well, I'm open to persuasion. But until I'm persuaded, it strikes me that the way someone is cruel to people in their own country is pretty much the way they're going to be cruel to people in other countries. And likewise when it comes to acting as a benefactor. And so on, and so on, and so on.

(Page 38 ~39) Honor was bound up with fighting to the death.... The army lived up to the code to such an extent that in the north Burma campaign the proportion of the captured to the dead was 142 to 17,166. That was a ratio of 1:120. And of the 142 in the prison camps, all except a small minority were wounded or unconscious when taken. In the armies of Occidental nations it is almost a truism that troops cannot stand the death of one fourth to one third of their strength without giving up; surrenders run about four to one. When for the first time in Hollandia, however, any appreciable number of Japanese troops surrendered, the proportion was 1:5 and was a tremendous advance over the 1:120 of north Burma.
Many of the orders which American prisoners had to obey, too, were those which had also been required of their Japanese keepers by their own Japanese officers; the forced marches and close packed transshipments were commonplace to them.

(Biff) Also fascinating was the evasion of rules allowed as long as one did not do so openly. This sounds not only Chinese, but also Scottish. Perhaps it's universal. (Page 39) Americans tell, too, of how rigorously sentries require that the prisoners should cover up their evasions of rules; the great crime was to evade openly.... During the day the rule that no food be brought back with them from the countryside was sometimes a dead letter - if the fruit and vegetables were covered up. If they could be seen, it was a flagrant offense which meant the Americans had flouted the sentries authority.

(Page 40) the shame of surrender was burned deeply into the consciousness of the Japanese.... They spoke with shocked disparagement of American prisoners of war who asked to have their names reported to the government so that their families would know they were alive. The rank-and-file, at least, were quite unprepared for the surrender of American troops at Bataan for they had assumed that they would fight it out the Japanese way. And they could not accept the fact that Americans have no shame in being prisoners of war.

(Page 41) The most melodramatic difference in behavior between Western soldiers and the Japanese was undoubtedly the cooperation the latter gave to the allied forces as prisoners of war. They knew no rules of life which applied in this new situation; they were dishonored and their life as Japanese was ended.... Some men asked to be killed,' but if your customs do not permit this, I will be a model prisoner.' They were better than model prisoners. Old army hands and longtime extreme nationalists located ammunition dumps, carefully explained the disposition of Japanese forces, wrote our propaganda and flew with our bombing pilots to guide them to military targets. It was as if they had turned over a new page; what was written on the new page was the opposite of what was written on the old, but they spoke the lines with the same faithfulness.... Americans had not expected this right about-face from prisoners of war. It was not according to our code. But the Japanese behaved as if, having put everything they had into one line of conduct and failed at it, they naturally took up a different line.

(Biff) PRC Chinese and the Taiwanese do this too. In part it's because they have no deep logical framework underpinning many of their behavioral norms. They themselves don't know why they do what they do. Which is all of us most of the time, but more for some cultures than others.

Particularly those which don't discuss who they are and how they got there freely, such as the poor citizens of the PRC. This is why it's cranks can be so fanatical. To crank out a math metaphor, it's easy to think 2+2=5 when there's no alternative in the house; or to believe that 2+2=4 is a conspiracy of two pairs nefariously trying to overthrow the traditional times tables and get a leg up on the prime numbers. Sound like nonsense? Try talking to some of the folks in the PRC about where their sacred territory begins and ends. The other week I watched a televised BBC debate in Shanghai in which a Hong Kong pundit declared that Taiwan was discovered by the Dutch four centuries ago, only to be corrected by a PRC hack that Taiwan was discovered by the Chinese 17 centuries ago. Tell it to the aborigines! Most, if not all, peacetime patriots in the PRC are the descendants of peoples conquered by what was formerly China, in other words, aborigines converted to their ancestors' enemy cause. Now that they've no historical memory, care of controlled speech and the Great Firewall of China, it's impossible to even debate this rationally with them.

And of course flip-flopping in behavioral norms is most pronounced in attractive women or gold-diggers of either sex for that matter. It's a commonplace that the moral schemes of men and women are vastly different and that the latter's version is more elastic because their social position is weaker and they have more to lose by sticking to their guns. Honor in England or America, in anyone short of a saint, requires complete financial independence. For otherwise the knee-bending and moral compromising begins at the office and ends following a hen-pecked evening with the significant other. I've been saying for years that women, taking one with the next, are much less democratically minded than men. Men trust one another much more than women tend to trust each other or trust men for that matter. Arguably women's cynicism is a sign of savvy and superior pragmatism. But that's another subject for another day.

Wednesday, April 06, 2005

Steve Forbes, Forbes Inc. CEOAt American University in Washington, DC, Forbes Inc. CEO, Steve Forbes, talks about social security and future retirees. (video link)

Tuesday, April 05, 2005

On face: I have to wonder whether face is so important in consensus based societies because the decision-making skills of the members are so remarkably weak. For the members, decision-making and other aspects of what we in non-consensus societies consider to be part of the natural thinking process, are an effort requiring prodigies of sweat and likely to result in accusations of heresy and result in ostracism.

Is there any harsher social comment in Chinese than, "You're strange"? (And notice how feminine that sounds too, suggesting the run of our women-folk have poor reasoning skills, ergo the various epithets I learned as a country teenager for women, "mindfuck" "headfuck" "can't live with 'em, can't live without 'em") And how many times have I found that praising a Chinese person for being different was actually an accusation they felt had to be defended.

Those who can only think poorly for themselves naturally have weak staying power in hierarchies because they can't defend themselves verbally during office politics and similar skirmishing. Ergo, pride (face) and the imposition of shame become non-violent defense/offense tactics. Note how face is silent, mute, dumb. As opposed to the banter, cant, spin, and slang-whanging which constitutes the gift of the gab so highly appraised in our society.

Given that consensus based societies arise due to weak reasoning skills in their members, and given that poor logic skills must have been something all of our ancestors suffered from in earlier generations, I also have to wonder whether consensus based societies are remnants of an earlier, primitive preliterate human society stage. Perhaps I've been butting my head against the Paleolithic age all these years. That would explain much...haha..
For an idea of the lunacy that erupts when free speech is curtailed, check out the following forum discussion, which includes this:

I believe China should start researching a type of nuclear bomb that, when detonated, has the ability to destroy the entire globe. ... One thing we need to consider is that the survival abilities of the Chinese people are very very strong, so if there are a few lucky people who survive this nuclear blast, then they are probably Chinese people. Then we can start another civilization and perhaps unite the entire world again.

Note that the author focuses on the 'survival abilities' of the Chinese people. A thought-provoking turn of phrase given that the Chinese population has gone on tremendous benders over the past 2000 years as the national population has been starved to death, diseased to death, and slaughtered to death, to put it in a grammatical form the Chinese speaker will find warmly familiar. I beat you to death, hate you to death, kill you to death. These are all standard Chinese tropes for pungent sentiments. Death, death, and more death. Here's a viable sentence in Chinese: "Beat me to death and I still never would have guessed that Elvis was creeping around Wal-Mart." For a chirpy happy people, with scarlet red holidays and finger-shredding fire crackers, they have a great love of the word death. Perhaps if the survival skills of the Chinese people had been honed to a greater virtuosity, there would be less flippant talk of death because the people as a collective would have controlled routine population explosions and resource exhaustion and avoided several millennia of internecine slaughters, tree-bark and dirt-eating famines, and children-swapping cannibalism.

But more to the point here is that the author considers the starting of another civilization and the uniting of the entire world all over again to be paramount to his doomsday bomb proposal, a sort of global spring cleaning, an ethnic cleansing of the sterile planet Neutron. By civilization he's referring to one that is moral and harmonious, and in sync with chi, human nature, and the natural world and which gallantly kills splittists and heretics to death to protect us from bad elements. By uniting the entire world again, he's referring to uniting the entire known world: i.e. China. Given that many Chinese patriots have far-flung patriotic imaginations, they make claims on reuniting the motherland and recovering sacred national territory which, by the way, includes Alaska because Alaska means 'my home' in Shanghainese. Uniting the entire world means pasting imperial scarlet double-happy signs over the illiterate graffiti of inconsequential languages such as English and Spanish.

The sweet talk about how we can start another civilization fires the imagination. But who is we? Does he imagine he's going to survive a nuclear bomb that "when detonated" can liquidate the entire globe? Probably not. He's really thinking of the collective we. And the reason his thoughts have soared so high is because his self-worth is so low. Although one may not think of the Chinese as a people who make decisions through consensus, to a large degree they do. This also helps account for the familiar weaseling that takes place behind the scenes and the loose fealty to morals behind the door, despite all the fire-breathing tall talk in public. And decision-making through consensus is a sign that the participants in the decision-making have very weak reasoning and critical thinking skills. A person who has a strong opinion does not go for consensus making; he's a trouble maker with a fancy for heresy, apostasy, and hot gospeling. Souls in a collective who have strong opinions don't form a consensus: they squabble and backstab and jockey for political supremacy.

Here however, you have someone who is abjectly, nay, gloriously, willing to sacrifice himself for the greater good of the collective we. We're introduced to the Chinese suicide bomber. Again, this sort of thinking arises because he does not see himself as being any more worthy than any other member of the collective. And again, this is because he has no substantial opinions of his own and when he does have them he expects everyone else to share them and is astonished, offended, and hurt when they don't. (I've seen this plenty of times in action and I've been naive and romantic enough to do it too.) Again, this is because his fellow mortals strive heroically to remain free of and untainted by personal opinions (which, by owing of being different, can only be heretical and thus perilous) and even less by way of logic and critical thinking skills. To understand China under the communist yoke, it helps to view its intellectuals as being extraordinarily self-effacing: willing ants in the ant farm. But perhaps I overstate it; having little sense of self to begin with (due to the Chinese family culture), there is little effacing necessary.

This also helps explain the oft stated willingness of China's peacetime patriots to sacrifice a couple hundred million citizens to bring Taiwan back to mother's lap. After all, when no one is worth any more than anyone else, then everyone is essentially replaceable and expendable. Like ants bridging water with their own bodies. Their role in life is reduced to serving as glorious cadavers sacrificed to the greater good.

Monday, April 04, 2005

A Review of The Ugly American, William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick (1958):

This book was put up as a primer for those few freaks curious, to the point of even reading a book, as to what was up with American foreign aid failing to deliver in the 1950s. The authors put their shoulders into explaining why Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam ended up proving the domino theory wasn't just a theory. The book is framed as a novel, but each chapter is an allegory for situations the two authors witnessed while working their way across South and Southeast Asia. As such, though competently written, this fictional work is no more a novel than Sinclair Lewis's Babbitt or Aldous Huxley's Chrome Yellow, both of which too are indictments of social stereotypes. But this book is more happening than its predecessors because there's a juicier range of characters and the scenarios are better designed and come with plot twists.

Also, as few fiction authors have a creative imagination that can stay afloat for more than a few paragraphs, they rely on the usual standby of sticking closely to the truth. Fortunately, given their vast experience getting screwed by commies and stymied by US bureaucrats, they have some swell anecdotes. The prose is clean, unambitious, slightly better than journalese, and there's a regrettable absence of nifty turns of phrase. Character development is only that required to show the historical inevitability of the protagonist's actions.

In an early chapter, a goodhearted American entrepreneur providing cheap quality milk to the locals ends up with a gun to his head because he becomes successful and thus a threat to vested international worker interests. A local doing the bidding of the local communists (a former friend whose family is being held hostage) demands that he dump a jug of a local date-rape drug into his factory's milk. The alternative is to be shot on the spot, whereupon the communist will stand on his cadaver like an African game-hunter and proudly proclaim that he'd been shot just as he was trying to sneak the drug into the day's milk production. A Hollywood struggle ensues. Eventually the entrepreneur is beaten up by the locals and railroaded out of town when the locals burst in and the part-time commie persuades them that the foreign devil was out to deflower them while they snored.

The point of the story is not just that commies are wily but that they had an adept grasp of local conspiracy theories and rural legends, so their propaganda was less sophisticated and thus more intelligible to yokels. There was a local mythology regarding date rape drug use and thus when a foreigner came into town offering an improvement on a local beverage, he left himself vulnerable to the possibility of such a set-up. In another chapter, American grain is imported to be given to the locals. However, in the warehouse communist sympathizers stamp it all over with "Gift of the USSR" in the local language. The stand-in ignoramus that serves as Uncle Sammy's rep can't read it and so, despite considering himself an "inside dopester", doesn't understand he's being swindled. This chapter was based on real events such as 1950's India receiving tractors from the US and the whole shipment being stenciled in the local warehouse with "Gift of the USSR." The Indian population became increasingly angry at US stinginess with Mao becoming three times more popular than Ike.

In addition to this, the book points out that most American diplomatic representatives did not speak the language of the people in the country they were appointed to. The authors point out in the epilogue that the US ambassador to France at that time spoke German but not French; the US ambassador to Germany spoke French but not German. Not a single US diplomatic representative in Southeast Asia spoke the local language.

They point out that most of the constructive work was performed by private individuals (analogous to UN reps calling for conferences and regional studies during the recent tsunami crisis, as opposed to the US and Australian navies which got on the ball and saved lives immediately). Some of these private individuals were affiliated with religious organizations, others simply motivated individuals: wanderers who married locally, renegade engineers, mechanics looking for a fresh start, and so forth.

This is contrasted with the US bureaucracy of the time which was not only bloated, as usual, but also functionally incompetent on the whole, as usual. The US bureaucracy was devoted to showboating, cocktail parties (Dick Nixon complained about this loudly) and to huge pork-barrel projects which made headlines and helped win elections back home. Highways were constructed in boondocks lacking automobiles. Hydro projects were planted in populations without electric power grids or electric appliances or irrigation infrastructure to take advantage of the head pond.

Furthermore, when private individuals in the countryside were effective, their reputation for good works usually became an embarrassment to the diplomatic clowns in town who got down to the slippery business of having them legally ejected from the national circus. The hero of the book is an the ugly American who is an ornery tinkering mechanic who speaks the local language and gets the job done. He is contrasted with the beautiful people, the bimbo collective infesting the US bureaucracy which spends its time preening, drinking, chasing cock and skirts. This book also unconsciously brings up the drinking habits of that generation. Everyone's guzzling all the time. Everyone good or bad is soaked in alcohol. Nothing gets done without hooch. The men do bourbon and pilsner; all the women are whisky drinkers. This generation went into recovery right before I began a brief stint of bartending in the early 1980's, shafting management (it was mutual) and ripping off customers (that's what they seemed to be there for) at a Canadian tourist trap.

The book also carries on about official French corruption, alive and well then just as it is today. Corporate bribery overseas is presently a tax deductible expense for businesses with head offices in France. In those long ago days, the French in Vietnam worked with the world's premier heroin growers, the Montagnards (mountain aborigines), facilitating their export of the drug to destinations known and unknown. JFK wanted to end the biz but learned the hard way that it was the only form of persuasion that worked keeping the Montagnards on the US side. Thus Air America and the French Connection. The book points out that in those days bringing French companies into a country typically meant setting up a monopoly arrangement to "protect" the market and give the bureaucrats skim money ops. Sounds similar to some of the development projects that Canada has engaged in in the Caribbean.

When it comes to corruption, capitalism is the cleanest system, welfare state socialism is significantly dirtier, and in communist states the level of corruption, like the level of state power, is absolute. When government enters an industry it always creates monopolies and trusts. For that matter, government itself is a monopoly and a trust.

The authors of this book, like myself, are no fans of big government. The authors place a particular focus upon securing popular involvement of the locals. For example, when one of the localized foreigners wants to persuade the locals that they should oppose communism, he does not hector or lecture them. He poses questions, withdraws from the conversation, and lets the locals work out their own solutions. After all, commonsense dictates that communism's implications, whether collective ownership or the banning of religious faith, is not going to be popular with the locals of any locale on this planet. Letting people form their own decisions means that they have a secure grounding in the conclusions that they reach. One of the problems with reporters and academics is that too many of their conclusions are acquired second-hand care of opinion makers. Unless you make your own decisions on issues from the ground up, you can't be sure of anything at the end of the day. Everything ends up a broken record playing 'he said, she said.'

In another chapter, a different localized foreigner wants to persuade locals that using a different kind of broomstick will improve people's posture and end the chronic stooping arthritis of old people in the village. The solution is not to import broomsticks from America, but to locate a local reed that naturally grows to a sufficient height as opposed to the traditional short reed indigenous in that region. Once the foreigner locates a place where the reed grows, she then brings back several of the reeds and plants them around her house. She begins using one of them is a broomstick. She lets locals curiosity summoned them to ask her about her new improved broomstick. In other words, rather than lecturing them, offending them and nannying them into dependence, as is common with left-wingers jonesing for the adulation of their "inferiors", she encourages them to proceed from their own sense of initiative.

In yet another situation, yet another localized foreigner wants to persuade locals to use his a mechanical pump design of his. He also sticks with the rule of thumb that any sort of device which is to become popular in-country must be something which can be manufactured locally. His design incorporates 100% new and secondhand materials available locally. He develops a bicycle powered irrigation pump which can be manufactured around the country. Rather than apply for patents, he goes into a cooperative venture with a local mechanic and the village head man to establish a company with stock shares. They hire a sales force on commission. The design itself is not patented and thus available for anyone around the country to use.

In other words, the authors were strongly opposed to foreign aid. They mentioned the cliché that when you give money away, not only do people become dependent and helpless, but also quite resentful. If you're the one forking out the pork, you're the one with the power. Nobody likes someone with more power than themselves. As was very evident during the Iraq War, even if you liberate country and foster democracy, don't expect the rest of the world to thank you for it. It's busy being envious, jealous, and petty minded. This is the human condition.

Last but not least, the authors point out that the Soviets never employed any locals in their embassies. All of their butlers, chefs, and other flunkies were imported directly from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, above 90% of them spoke the local language. The United States diplomatic representatives tended to hire armies of locals for a variety of menial tasks. As a result, they suffered constant leaks of information and the commies were always up on their game. The Commies in China offered schools instructing cadres from a variety of Southeast Asian Nations and classes were held not in Chinese, but in the language of the visiting cadres’ native country. This is contrasted with the United States which offered subsidized US university education for locals, but only in English which had the result of restricting free education to locals who came from upper-class city backgrounds. The problem, the authors point out, was that most of Southeast Asia at that time was rural. Just educating upper-class city folk meant the US Foreign Service was quite out of touch with the country bumpkins, and it was they who powered the successful communist movements in the region.

A surprisingly interesting book that’s worth the read.
Philip Short talks about the life of Cambodia's Pol Pot, the former leader of the Khmer Rouge who ruled the country from 1975 to 1979 and was responsible for the deaths of over one million people. Mr. Short gives an overview of Pol Pot's early life as a student in Paris and talks about the influence the French Revolution and Joseph Stalin had on him. He also discusses the conditions in Cambodia that he thinks played a significant role in shaping Pol Pot's political philosophy, including the country's Buddhist tradition.

Author Bio: Philip Short has been a foreign correspondent for the Times (London), the Economist, and the BBC. He is the author of "Mao: A Life." (link)

Sunday, April 03, 2005

On Reporters

As I've said elsewhere, I think one of the key misconceptions about reporters is that they're experts. Or, at least well-informed amateurs. They’re usually neither. Reporters cover too many stories too quickly to become conversant with the issues, the smelly little orthodoxies as Orwell called them, the scandals and rumors, the free-ride poseurs, the cadging crooks and hard-worn saints of each field that they cover. You can't cover a handful of stories every week and expect to be well-informed as to the particulars of any of them.

The average reporter struggling to write a book, even just a memoir (which by nature requires little research), needs something on the order of a couple of years. More often than not the sum of two years of archive research, dust allergies and writer’s block is a hardcover bestseller ridiculed by those in the know for its journalese and dilettantism. Again, even here, you can seldom rely on reporters for useful information. What you can rely upon them for is rumor mongering, aiming for the lowest common denominator, pushing the libel and slander laws to the limit, pumping statistics up to the highest amperage to produce infotainment because that's what we want.

Another problem as pointed out by Bernard Goldberg is reporters' flaccid membership in the club of truth-seekers; a club which I regret to report seems ever less likely to exist. Like members of any other organization, issues become fogged up with politically correct vaporizing in the upper chambers of the corporation, in this case the newspaper firm. This is primarily because the average reporter has little more idea of how the world works than a cab driver, and for much the same reason that most of what he hears is gossip.

Thus many, many reporters were easily persuaded that it wasn't safe to tell the truth right after 9-11, that the US invasion of Afghanistan was going to be a Vietnam quagmire, and that George Bush was going to lose the last election because no one they knew would vote for him. As a result of their traditional ivory tower innocence, what often appears from afar to be a moral compromise (ex: deliberately promoting the lie that AIDS was a threat to the run of the mill heterosexual, deliberately quashing newsroom speculation that the DC sniper could be other than Caucasian thus delaying his capture) often turns out to be just another wrong-way greenhorn whose nose is pulled in the wrong direction as easily as a weathervane.

One problem is that the freshly graduated media professional does not leave university versed in economics, military history, epidemiology, the law, and so forth. Instead, they leave bored and with a pronounced distaste for not just formal learning, but for learning of any and all kinds. Further, they depart the quad confused by a four-year muddle of multiculturalism, postmodernism, left-wing conspiracy theories and bird courses on media ethics.

Another problem is even more fundamental than that. Most reporters are simply trained from childhood to be parsimonious with the truth, when not downright dishonest. Growing up in a normal middleclass suburban or urban family, they learn to say one thing to daddy and something else to mommy. Mommy tends to encourage fibbing, white lies, guilt trips, the rest of the arsenal which is filled out and worked to perfection by the more attractive sort of gold-digger in do-me pumps et al. The problem with half-truths and polite evasions is that friends and family and colleagues pick up on the fact you don't like to deal with harsh truths or awkward opinions.

Information workers don't often deal themselves with physical violence, inclement weather destroying crops, gangsters and rackets, and so forth. They pay taxes and let the politicians and cops deal with it. They live in a bubble of softness and niceties. This does have its benefits, but when it comes to conversation of any and all kinds they want fun, they want to be entertained, stroked, praised, or otherwise amused. They don't like straight talkers because they find them offensive, uncouth, and unreasonable, in a word: intimidating because they're honest, and honest people play by enigmatic, unfamiliar rules. Information workers (from reporters to professors) end up surrounding themselves with people like themselves who have a bundle of book learning and noggins full of second-hand facts and figures (i.e. "According to statistics released today by so and so), but nothing they can really put their hands on and squeeze to be sure its real.

They don't have a full body of life experience because they're always chasing down the life experience of others, usually after the experience is over. And they seldom have the reality check of non-information workers challenging their ideas; and when they do they wave them off because they lack the sort of unverifiable second-hand information (i.e. statistics) that they favor. Most debates with information workers come down, in the end, to “he said she said.” You quote your statistics; your opponent quotes his anecdotes. You quote your conspiracy theorist Chomsky; your opponent quotes his conspiracy theorist Moses. Neither is dealing with anything properly describable as reality. When these two fantasy lands cannot be bridged, the information worker often says "Well that's just your opinion." That's a sign you're dealing with someone whose views are based on second-hand information.

So what you have in the end is reporters who are in the main preoccupied with upping their ratings, moving along with the whimsy of political correct fashions, trying to fulfilling their left-wing obligation to be social messiahs, and who are at the end of the day fundamentally ignorant despite the wealth of facts and figures at their disposal. If you want to see this, all you have to do is turn on C-SPAN and watched interviews with reporters. It was shocking at first to hear how often reporters refused comment on areas closely related to their beats. However, most reporters are not interested in their field. It's just a job to them. Some of the most incurious people you will ever meet are reporters and researchers. Not because their profession encourages this, but because most people aren’t curious. Public school will do that.

When I've spoken informally to medical researchers about issues like AIDS, none of them knew anything about the key people who jump-started these fields. None of them knew who Robert Gallo was, or Peter Duesberg, Michael Fumento, Kary Mullis, and so on. The only reason they were temporarily interested in the subject was because I can assemble a story from scratch reasonably well. They would have been just as engaged had I launched into the evolution of screwdrivers beginning with the biological origin of iron ore deposits in the pre-Cambrian Ice Age when the oceans where oxygen free and held high concentrations of dissolved iron. It's just a theory, one of many interesting theories I've come across. And I can hold most people's attention while discussing such things by giving them context. But I don't deceive myself into believing that any of these people rushed home to begin looking into these subjects themselves. They're just not curious. Their careers are just an improvement over bricklaying or chicken plucking, more money and more toys for less sweat. The same is true for me too. For all the years I've worked as a professional translator, and a fairly good one at that, I've yet to read a single book on translation. And that sort of professional ignorance is typical. For that matter I'm probably still ignorant enough to be a reporter too.
Bernard Goldberg's Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distort the News.

This book opens up with an excellent quote: When it comes to arrogance, power, and lack of accountability, journalists are probably the only people on the planet to make lawyers look good. - Steven Brill

Bernard Goldberg put in 27 years as a reporter with CBS News where he flew his own television investigative journalism series.

I learned the hard way how unreliable the media can be via researching the AIDS epidemic which seemed oddly absent here in Taiwan. Goldberg does a whole chapter on how the media cynically magnified AIDS into a best-selling welter of fear, completely unwarranted by the facts. Remember the media frenzy over SARS, the latest incarnation of the 1917 flue epidemic? Many if not most of the SARS victims in the Free World died due to the botched immune-suppressant therapy prescribed by the World Health Organization. Of course death by bungled injection didn't scrape up much news, nor did the many pathetic victims in Hong Kong who died slow deaths over the following several months due to unstoppable bone deterioration caused by the WHO's very same therapy.

After running a news website for a year, and watching reporters consistently highball statistics, botch even the simplest addition of figures, play up victimization at every possible turn (the BBC has the worst tear-squeezer of them all, a female with a great vocal impression of the Adam's Family's butler Lurch) write advocacy journalism whose articles included facts that clearly defeated the reporters opinion on the issue at hand, I grew annoyed and eventually quite contemptuous of reporters as a class. Naturally there are must be some reporters who shine, but outside of David Brooks and Chris Hitchens, none other come racing to mind.

The following is a grab-bag of self-explanatory quotes from his chapter on the calculated fumbling of the homeless issue:

(Page 65~71) No one knows exactly how many homeless there were in America in the 1980s and early 1990s, but there were researched, educated estimates. For example, the US Census Bureau figured it was about 230,000. The General Accounting Office of Congress put the number between 300,000 and 600,000. The Urban Institute said that there were somewhere between 355,000 and 462,000 homeless Americans. These numbers weren't state secrets. Reporters knew what they were. They just didn't care.

Meanwhile, the homeless lobby was putting the number of homeless in the millions. No matter how bad a problem really is, advocates think they need to portray it as worse.

We have come to expect this of advocates. They know their cause is worthy, so what harm can a little exaggeration do? But reporters - when they also see the cause as worthy - buy into it. They also become advocates. They take the numbers as gospel. They have no desire to look too deep, because if they do, God forbid, they might find something they'd rather not find. There's an old saying in the newsroom: don't let the facts stand in the way a good story!

So in 1989 on CNN, Candy Crowley, a fine, serious reporter, said that "Winter is on the way and 3 million Americans have no place to call home."

3 million!

Not to be outdone, in January of 1993, Jackie Nespral, the anchor of NBC Weekend Today, said, "Nationally right now, 5 million people are believed to be homeless... and the numbers are increasing."

5 million!! And the numbers are increasing!!!

Charles Osgood of CBS news, one of the most talented journalists in all of broadcasting, reported, "It is estimated that by the year 2000, 19 million Americans will be homeless unless something is done, and it done now."

19 million homeless by the turn-of-the-century!!!!

And Ray Brady, one of the best in the business, who was reporting for the CBS evening news, found homeless people who actually lived in homes. These were - ready for this? - the "hidden homeless."
Who are they? People who aren't homeless at all, but, because they can't afford their own places, are living at home with Mom and Dad, often in cushy houses in the suburbs with big-screen TVs and three squares a day.

"Of all the lies that are swallowed and regurgitated by the media, the ones that hurt the most come from the good guys," Kathryn Dunn wrote in the New Republic in 1993. "The grassroots do-gooders, the social work heroes, the nonprofit advocacy groups battling for peace, justice, and equality."

Did anyone, least of all seasoned reporters who pride themselves on their skepticism, really believe that the vast majority of the homeless - the addicted and the mentally ill - would virtually disappear from America's streets if only Ronald Reagan hadn't cut housing programs?

Scott Schuger, a Washington journalist who wrote a piece in the Washington Monthly - "Who are the Homeless?" - certainly didn't. In a monument to common sense and politically incorrect wisdom, Schubert wrote, "There can be all the low-cost housing in the world and an untreated paranoid won't set foot in it, and an untreated schizophrenic might burn it down... and a drug addict will spend the rent money on crack."

When the "proper" victims are involved, we become journalists/social workers. And we live by the journalist/ social worker motto: afflict the comfortable and comfort the afflicted.

We know who our viewers are. We know what they look like. And we know that they would be drawn more to stories about homeless people who looked just like their mothers and fathers and sons and daughters than homeless people who look like, well, homeless people.

But to do that we first need to go to central casting and get just the right kind of homeless people on the news. White was better than black. Clean was better than dirty. Attractive was better than unattractive. Sane was better than insane. And sober was better than addicted. So when the TV people went looking for just the right kind of homeless face to put on the news programs, they went to people like Robert Hayes, who ran the National Coalition for the Homeless in New York.

In 1989, Hayes told the New York Times that when congressional committees in TV news producers contact him, "They always want white, middle-class people to interview."

Walter Goodman, who writes about television for the New York Times, came up with a name for what we in the media were doing. He called it the "prettifying of reality."

[He wrote] The reasons for the choices are not obscure. If you want to arouse sympathy for the homeless, you cannot put forward offputting specimens. Television news producers can count on advocacy groups to supply them with model victims for viewing purposes, people who may even be untouched by the other afflictions discovered in...[a] survey of the homeless: mental illness, AIDS, domestic violence, and lack of education and skills. And why should a producer focus on one of the 50% of single homeless people who have served time in jail when he can just as easily find someone without a record.... the result is a prettifying of reality.

Saturday, April 02, 2005

Parting comment on Ian Buruma's excellent Inventing Japan

MacArthur’s remark in 1951, that in terms of modern civilization the Japanese were like a 12 year old boy, was typical of his thinking. The context of this remark, made to a joint committee in the US Senate, is worth repeating. MacArthur is comparing Japan to Germany. The Germans, he said, where a “mature race.” The Japanese were still in “a very tuitionary condition.” Science, culture, and religion were as highly developed in Germany as in other Western nations. The Nazi poison could be drained from German society without changing German culture, which had after all produced Luther, Beethoven, and Goethe. The Nazi regime had been a perversion of German culture, its leaders had acted brutally in a deliberate attempt to dominate the world. The Germans did not have to be tutored in the ways of another civilization. (MacArthur did not mean this as a complement; in his view the Germans were all the more despicable because they should’ve known better.) The Japanese, on the other hand, had behaved like the children they were. They had, in MacArthur’s version of events, “stumbled” into militarism because they didn’t know any better. This also implied that the Japanese, in the immature state, were still flexible enough to improve under firm and fair guidance. (Page 133)

Ian Buruma does not seem to agree with this assessment of Macarthur’s, perhaps due to multiculturalism, but I have to wonder if there’s not actually quite a bit that Mac got right. One doesn’t emerge from feudalism into a modern, fully developed democracy overnight has in Buruma has plainly demonstrated. The sort of sincere pure-spirited suicidal assassins that he mentions seem like something out of the dark ages or out of an early Muslim era whose zealots gave the English language the word assassin. This plus the barbarism of the war, the factionalism, emperor worship, etc. Unless we play politically correct games and accept that my ancestors in skins worshipping druid gods and torching human sacrifices in wicker cages were mature civilizations on par with the maturity of the developed nations of today, then we might as well call a spade a spade. As such, I don’t have any problem with Mac’s saying the Japanese were immature as a civilization then. No doubt, this remains accurate even today. As it is with regard to China which is held together by the PRC regime (thus preventing a potentially dreadful civil war and economic collapse) but also held back by the regime intellectually and institutionally thus keeping the nation’s civilization in a state of enforced immaturity.

An example of this in modern day Japan is the decision-making by consensus, a feature that appeals to the peaceably minded as civilized and harmonious. But actually it’s a reflection of retarded (i.e. immature or undeveloped) decision-making skills. Thus, the seemingly endless series of Japanese prime ministers over the years faulted for being spineless and incapable of either forming decisions or sticking to them. Surely this is the product of a socio-cultural construct: a traditional responsibility-dodging slave mindset (Taiwan has this in spades) featuring the remarkable absence of its opposite in the political sphere, the master mindset. It would appear (and I claim nothing but ignorance about Japanese elections) as if Japanese voters do not support Alpha male candidates and, given that the national culture produces an overwhelming majority of citizens with a slave mentality (a comment the more perceptive Chinese writers have labeled the Chinese with for a century or more), Japanese democracy is incapable of functioning efficiently. This I would guess is perhaps because the elected representatives of the majority slave-mentality citizenry are themselves too timid and herd-like to forge decisions. I suspect that consensus is never forged either. Too active a verb. Too aggressive a word-picture. More like consensus appears by default by virtue of the players giggling or peeking at everyone else and playing a game of political musical chairs, trying not to be the odd one out; like fish shoaling or sheep flocking together, correctly presuming that for the meek to inherit the earth, safety lies in numbers. I’ve seen this in action first-hand in Taiwan. And I’ve been guilty of it myself. It puts a new spin on Mencken’s definition of a politician as an animal that sits on a fence and yet has both ears to the ground.

Friday, April 01, 2005

Part three of my never ending review of Inventing Japan, by Ian Buruma

In China, Chiang Kai-shek's army was moving north in an attempt to unify the nation under a nationalist government. The Chinese saw Manchuria as part of China; the Japanese, despite earlier treaties to that effect, did not. They preferred to see it as a kind of lawless no man's land, to which Japan would bring order. Since Manchuria had been part of the last Chinese empire, which lasted for almost three centuries, the Chinese had a legitimate claim. The fact that large parts of China were lawless did not give Japan a right to take them over. (Pages 88, 89)

Manchuria had been part of the last Chinese empire, that I can go with, but the last Chinese empire was not run by the Chinese but by the Manchus. The Manchus were not Chinese, despised the Chinese as cannibal scum, and established a caste system making the Chinese literally third-rate citizens of their own country. Chinese were banned from marrying Manchus on pain of death. Chinese were banned from moving into Manchuria until the last decade of the 19th century.

As to Japan not having the 'right' to take over parts of China, this presupposes that there is a body adjudicating and enforcing sovereignty. For otherwise, there's no point in talking about rights. Rights can not exist outside of enforcement. It would be like getting hot and bothered talking about your rights with a burglar pointing a crowbar at your brainpan. It's pointless unless there are cops around. Given that there was no body to adjudicate and enforce sovereignty, then talk of rights is futile. Whoever could take over the lawless territories did take over the lawless territories. End of story.

And Chiang Kai-shek was hardly a representative of China as he had yet to conquer the territory from the present legal owners, various warlords. What distinguishes his rights from theirs? Force. Might is right. At the end of the day, it always has been and always will be. (Democracy survives not because it is just, but because it produces the strongest economies and most powerful military force. In other words, democracy is an excellent example of how might is right in the political sphere.) Chang Kai-shek even as the unifier of China was not representative of the Chinese given the fact that he was not a democratic ruler. You might as well pretend that any of the emperors ever represented the Chinese people. (We’re back to people’s emperors again…haha…) The people were owned by their emperors. Chiang Kai-shek enjoyed the most promising run at becoming the new emperor at the time, vying with Mao the eventual usurper of the throne.

Had the Japanese taken over Manchuria and retained it, the present day occupants of Manchuria would be living under Japanese democracy and enjoying a very high standard of living indeed. It seems to me to be a prejudice arising from victor's justice to imagine that the colonization of Manchuria by the Chinese was somehow preferable to the colonization of Manchuria by the Japanese when clearly Manchuria was doing much better under Japanese rule prior to the second world war (it enjoyed the highest industrialization rate within 'China' and the highest standard of living, leading to a huge flood of immigrants (for lack of a better word)) and given that the situation would have no doubt continued that way had Manchuria either remained Japanese territory or somehow remained a province of the Republic of China. Unfortunately it is part of the People's Republic of China. I do not doubt Ian Buruma’s bona fides. But he appears inadvertently to believe that the present day Manchurian population is properly the property of the People's Republic of China, what he would probably call citizens of the PRC. After all, a democracy is owned by its citizens as opposed to authoritarian regimes which own their citizens. (You can imagine how well that last sentence went over when I presented it to a bunch of PRC forum participants a week or so ago...haha...)

Within six months, much of Manchuria was in Japanese hands. The Chinese complained to the League of Nations. And the Japanese duly cranked out propaganda at home about Japan being victimized by the rest of the world. (Page 90)

Isn't that a beauty? The Japanese propagandized the Japanese. This is the kind of slippery doublespeak that rightfully belongs to the oeuvre of my latest ethnic impersonating hero, the late Eddy Said. Who the hell are ‘the Japanese’? What on earth is ‘Japan’?

You probably think I’m nitpicking, but this is just the sort of prose hell from which so much sulfurous patriotic bologna emerges. Ex: We Chinese were humiliated by England. That’s a classic line of peacetime patriots with poor social skills and angry with the developed world because they have a McDonalds but not a girlfriend. Most of the Chinese population lived right through the Opium War without ever knowing it took place. They sure didn’t watch it on television. Most of the population consisted of illiterate peasants living in medieval boondocks. No newspapers. Nadda. And how can ‘we’ be humiliated by events that took place before ‘we’ were born? Etc, etc, etc…


Following the maddening quote above, the book continues with: The prime minister at the time of the Manchurian incident, Wakatsuji Reijiro, was still a party politician who favored a conciliatory policy toward China. He was in the state of panic. The Kwantung Army was pushing Japan toward war, and there was nothing he could do about it, since military affairs were beyond his brief. The Army and Navy ministers in his cabinet were answerable to the Emperor as the supreme commander of the armed forces, but not to a mere civilian prime minister. The foreign minister, Shidehara Kijuro, was also an internationalist who tried to maintain good relations with China and the West. He was now in the invidious position of having to defend a fait accompli in Manchuria, caused by military officers over whom the civilian government had no control. The Emperor was advised by nervous courtiers and chiefs of staff not to antagonize his armed forces, lest they rebel and create disturbances at home. In a complete abdication of responsibility, the opposition party, the Seiyukai, criticized the government for not being belligerent enough. Meanwhile, Japanese troops began to move into Manchuria from Korea. The prime minister resigned.

His successor, Inukai Tsuyoshi, was no more successful in disciplining the military in China. He tried in vain to withhold official recognition of Manchuria as an "independent" state… Inukai, like his predecessor, was a pathetic bystander in these events. He appealed to the Emperor to intervene, but nothing happened. After one more attempt to stop Japanese reinforcements from escalating violence in Shanghai, Inukai was gunned down by Navy fanatics in his own house.

This is the sort of irony which makes history so fascinating for me and so frustrating for peacetime patriots who want to pretend that Japan is a person which beat up on another person: an old lady called China.

…Many of Japan's problems were the result of weakness and divisions at the pinnacle of the system rather than strength. Far from being a united nation, Japan was ruled by factions, in the courts, the military, the bureaucracy, and the diet, which fought one another with almost as much zeal as they displayed toward external enemies. (Page 91)

And this appalling infighting is typical of authoritarian regimes. According to Victor Davis Hanson’s Carnage and Culture it’s one of the reasons why authoritarian regimes, despite their typical appearance of strength during peacetime, are usually fragile and quite inferior in battle against democratic regimes which tend to look weak during peacetime but which unite during war and become much stronger.

Ian Buruma frequently talks about the purity and sincerity that various young men, assassins usually, were obsessed with and how it was usually met with a very positive response from the public. I'm wondering whether purity and sincerity have to do with animism. Purity and sincerity are reminiscent of British and Amierican Puritanism, bluenoses and bluestockings. Such morons believe there is a right way to do everything. All other options are morally wrong, i.e. heretical, and their proponents heretics. That’s were the witch burnings and assassinations come in.

Animism and Christianity are both conspiracy theories positing imaginary armies of good against imaginary armies of evil. Buruma mentions that most of these morally pure assassins were from the countryside, thus it's understandable that they’d view simplicity of mind as a virtue as opposed to the modern view of simplicity as a weakness as a sign of a simpleton. In developed countries one aims not for purity, but for impurity by way of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. The goal is to become urbane (i.e. of the city). Not rustic. Quite the difference.

From page 105: An American chaplain in Tokyo's Sugamo prison, where Japanese war criminals were held after the war, concluded from his many interviews that they 'had the belief that any enemy of the Emperor could not be right, so the more brutally they treated their prisoners, the more loyal to the Emperor they were being.'

Anyway this book is a great read and if I keep stopping to comment on it I’m never going to finish reading it. So that’s it.
Review of Inventing Japan, Ian Buruma, Part II

Little more than a year after that [1930], Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, who was trying desperately to keep radical Army and Navy factions from going to war with China, was murdered by a group of naval officers, called the Blood Pledge Society, in an attempted coup d'état. Two business leaders were killed as well, while other fanatics were bombing such symbols of right-wing hate as Inukai's party offices and the Bank of Japan. By then, the experiment with party government was over. Manchuria had been turned into a puppet state. And the war in China was only just beginning. (Page 76)

I quote this in passing because I'm often frustrated by patriotic morons on Internet forums who blame Japan for invading China. Given that Japan is not a person, but instead a block of real estate or a social collective or what have you, 'Japan' cannot be blamed for invading 'China'. Various individuals in Japan orchestrated various actions against various individuals or the collective masses in China. Call it an invasion if you want, but at least don't clog up the conversation by blaming an entity that lacks the ability to make choices and thus can't be blamed, i.e. 'Japan.' You might as well blame clouds for raining or ants for the architecture of their ant hills.

Kita's family background was neither xenophobic nor particularly romantic.... from an early age, Kita was seized by the ideal of absolute individual freedom. But the question of people's rights was too tame for him. In fact, he wasn't interested in peaceful politics at all. He was after absolutes and violent acts of will. As it did many Japanese idealists of his age, individualism confused him. (Page 77-78)

That last sentence sounds like comedy, and yet in contemporary China this is commonly the case. In part it's because idealism and patriotism usually results in the opposite of individualism: fascism. After all, all idealism is essentially a function of ignorance and stupidity as idealism is ipso facto the desire to bring into reality desires which are not pragmatic. Most peacetime patriots are simply unsuccessful lonely men with inferiority complexes who can't get laid. Such people are relatively easy to deal with because at least their patriotism is cynical. When the wind blows in the wrong direction, they scatter like quail, looking for a new cause such as victimization, reparations, entitlement, etc. You can often follow the money trail to the blank where their conscience should be found.

A different problem is people who take patriotism to heart, true believers blessed with handsome mugs and untroubled well-adjusted souls. For these natural-born messiahs, individuals are never as attractive as the people as a whole. Concepts being more attractive than touchy, persnickety unmotivated wrong-way individuals who tend to be imperfect, uncooperative and to get in the way.

Revolutionary violence, for Kita, was not so much political as religious, an act of personal, spiritual liberation.... the state, he argued, had been hijacked by corrupt oligarchs, bureaucrats, bankers, and industrialists. What was needed was a coup d'état that would give the "People's Emperor" absolute power. ... Kita’s cause had a particular appeal to junior officers in the Army, were mostly from poor rural areas and, like Kita Itte, blamed capitalist city slickers for corruption and degradation of the nation. A number of these men, burning with violent idealism, staged a coup in February 1936, aiming to give absolute power to the Emperor and purge...traitors and corrupt officials. (Pages 78-79)

People’s emperor? Truth odder than fiction yet again. Seems China tried that concept with Mao. Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, The Great Leap Forward, The Cultural Revolution…hmm. Jiang Zemin’s MBA-sounding “The Three Represents” lacks the rhythm and timbre of a good Little Red Book slogan, but then it’s bound to do much less harm. A dumb politico is usually the safer bet if you have the best interests of the nation's people in mind.

While reading Gavin Daws Prisoners of the Japanese I had the sneaky feeling that a herd of bumpkins were running the Japanese military. This helped explain the peculiarly childish cruelty of the various wanton mass slaughters, the romantic desire of young soldiers to emulate samurai by butchering defenseless people with swords (i.e. becoming comic book heroes via slashing everything that moved with glorious traditional weapons), the often fabulously amateurish nature of the medical experiments (transfusing horse blood into people), and the almost laughable (if it wasn't so tragic) traditional boorishness of Japanese officers chowing down on the livers of white POWs. Again, if you ask yourself what frame of mind it would take for you yourself to willingly do the above, surely it would be the frame of mind of an eager child with a yearning to dress up in adult roles such as hero, doctor, etc.

Not to mention that China's Guanxi Province saw Communist mucky-mucks chewing on the livers of upwards of 600 political prisoners during the Cultural Revolution. "Samo, samo!" as Japanese POW prison guards used to say.
Call me a slow-learner but it turns out that Edward Said was the Rigoberta Menchu of the Middle East. His parents were American, not Palestinian. He grew up in Egypt, not Palestine. His folks property was burned by an Egyptian mob and what was left was stolen by the Egyptian government, not the Israelis. Etc, etc, etc...

Well, Judd and I could never go for the master's inscrutable meandering prose. He's as patent a fraud as Michel Foucault. No one smart writes that poorly without good reason: the defensibility that elastic prose provides. Great camouflage. When writing is so deliberately clumsy that you can't nail the writer's meaning down as A without risking the real possibility that he might have been coyly hinting at B or providing an allegory for C or playing charades to indicate D and possibly the rest of the alphabet, with the Zodiac thrown in, then you have a style that's so loopy that you can reinvent meaning and intent whenever the growling of the critics gets too close for comfort. I smelt a rat right from the get-go of Orientalism.

Not sure which is worse: right-wing US politicians pretending to be racial supremacists (Lyndon Johnson, George Wallace, and Strom Thurmond) or left-wing intellectuals (Farley Mowat, Ward Churchill, and Noam Chomsky) goading us to feel guilt and pretending to suffer like Jesus on the Cross for sins that none of us could have committed unless one believes in guilt by association, psychic transportation, and is a Buddhist and believes in reincarnation and responsibility for former lives.

There are links to the two excerpted articles below. Enjoy.

The headmaster showed me the pre-1948 student enrollment records, and I spent hours going through three leather-bound enrollment ledgers, page by page. To my astonishment, I found no mention of Edward Said. A second time page-by-page through the same records, and I found no evidence he was ever enrolled there. ...Several months of extensive research made clear that there was something fundamentally wrong with the picture Said presented of himself - that of a Palestinian exile/refugee deserving of reparations from Israel. (link)

Is it not curious in the extreme that Said, while on record as remembering the "rooms [in this house] where as a boy he read Sherlock Holmes and Tarzan, and where he and his mother read Shakespeare to each other,"[65] has nowhere brought to mind the presence upstairs of the Yugoslavian consulate, the comings and goings of visa-seekers, diplomats, and politicians, including for a time the king of Yugoslavia himself, or the arrival of limousines and their elegantly attired occupants for official functions like the annual Yugoslavian independence-day reception? On November 29, 1947, the very night the UN voted in favor of the partition plan for Palestine, and a couple of weeks before he has told us the Saids were forced to leave for Cairo, this reception was attended by no lesser figures than the British-appointed mayor of Jerusalem;[66] Golda Meir, then director of the political department at the Jewish Agency;[67] Hussein Haldi, the secretary of the Arab Higher Committee;[68] and most of the city's social and political elite.[69] (link)
A special C-SPAN program features conversations with three Army soldiers and a Marine about their personal experiences in Iraq and at Walter Reed Medical Center. Additional conversations take place with the Commander of Walter Reed and a we take a look at physical and occupational therapy for injured soldiers. Almost four thousand patients from Operation Iraqi Freedom have been treated at Walter Reed since the war began.